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 The "resource curse", "Dutch disease", "gold rush", "blood diamonds" - these are just 
some of the epithets used when it comes to the role of natural resources in economic 
development. Of course, they do not make a positive trend for a constructive discussion 
on this topic. The purpose of the article is to change this attitude and establish the 
foundation for a road map, based on examples of successful economic development for 
the countries rich in minerals. The following main thesis is put forward: raw material 
production countries with high-quality human resources, expressed by economic and 
political institutions are better able to use income from the export of natural resources 
and achieve better results in terms of economic growth and social development. 
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The first significant systematic study of economic challenges related to natural resources was the work of 
Sachs and Warner called "Natural resource abundance and economic growth" (Sachs, J.D., A.M. Warner, 1995). 
This work laid the foundation for the hypothesis, became known later as "resource curse". The authors' main 
conclusion was the fact that the growth of economies with a high share of raw materials export in GDP for the 
twenty-year period from 1970 to 1990 was lower than the global average value. Some economists conducted a 
similar analysis. 
In the nineties, most economists seem to have come to the following consensus: "resource curse" really 
exists. This concept was created by Richard Auty (1993). But it was not enough to state simply that minerals 
have a negative impact on growth. This thesis demanded justification. So some concepts appeared that focus on 
different channels through which resource dependence hinders growth. In the 2000s, a group of authors (within 
the concept of economic channels) began to explore the impact of volatility in commodity prices on growth and 
development. The publications of Cavalcanti and co-authors et (Cavalcanti, T.V.d.V., et al., 2009; Cavalcanti, 
T.V.d.V., et al., 2011; Cavalcanti, T.V.d.V., et al., 2011), Van der Plegia and Pulhekke (2010), Leong and 
Mohaddes (2011) demonstrated the negative impact of this factor.  
However, in recent years as the result of more rigorous econometric analysis with the use of new, expanded 
data sets the hypothesis of "resource curse" became doubtful. Several scholars have come to different 
conclusions about the impact of natural resources. First, there were doubts about a particular period, chosen by 
Sachs and Warner for their research. Manzano and Rigobon published a report alleging that the historical period 
studied by Sachs and Warner, had a significant drop in raw material prices, which began in 1980 and lasted for 
20 years (this time is sometimes called oil abundance of eighties) (Manzano, O., R. Rigobon, 2001).  
Lederman and Maloney questioned the appropriateness of the attempt to make general conclusions about 
the impact of natural resources on growth and development (Lederman, D., W.F. Maloney, 2007; Lederman, D., 
W.F. Maloney, 2008). They suggested that some indicators used in previous studies may not be related to the 
degree of a country natural resources level. According to their analysis after the calculation of fixed effects the 
negative impact of resources disappeared: it allowed suggest that the factor of natural resources does not 
influence the result. The result is conditioned by the factor correlation with certain unobservable characteristics 
of the country.  
The doubts about direct economic impact of resource abundance prompted several authors to seek a hidden 
channel through which natural resources can impact the development. In macroeconomic hypotheses the 
emphasis was on such issues as the "Dutch disease" and price volatility, but there was an alternative approach, 
within which the major factor hindering the growth in countries rich in minerals is considered to be institutional 
flaws. However, the differences between two trends formed within this institutional approach shall be noted. 
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The first one was conditioned by the "resource curse" hypothesis: its representatives believe that the abundance 
of natural resources causes degradation of institutions, and corruption within the ruling elite, which leads to 
negative consequences for growth and development. In fact, the "resource curse" is transformed into 
"institutional curse." Another trend is institutionalism. It is also focused on institutions, but causal relationships 
are stated in the opposite way: the countries rich in natural resources are not doomed to institutional flaws, but 
on the contrary, the very weakness of institutions causes the growth and development decrease.  
 
Methods: 
Throughout history various mechanisms to reduce the impact of "resource curse" were developed. The main 
argument is the following: instead of fighting with different "curses" and "disease", states would be worth to 
look at themselves and analyze their own actions, and the nature and role of institutions they create, maintain, 
and often destroy. It would also be useful to compare the instruments of state control with the mechanisms that 
were successfully applied at the corporate level (for example, to reduce the price fluctuation effects). A number 
of states take the abovementioned measures creating stabilization funds and other similar structures. In this 
sense, the "Dutch disease" and the impact of  commodity price volatility provide essentially institutional, rather 
than purely economic problems. Both factors create difficulties in certain circumstances, usually associated with 
the absence or insufficient development of certain institutions.  
A few reasons of particular vulnerability for commodity-dependent economies should be mentioned when it 
comes to rent-seeking. Four reasons are particularly important among all other reasons.  
• minerals immobility. A characteristic feature of extractive industries is the dependence on immobile 
minerals while they are under the ground. As a result, the real state control in this field is much stronger than in 
other sectors: a mine or an oil well can not be transferred in another country. As a result, the state authorities 
have much more options in terms of control.  
• The raw nationalism. Minerals belong to the state and this fact creates a strong economic bias in favor of 
government control as opposed to private one in the whole chain of production, processing and distribution. 
This paradigm is often called resource nationalism. In almost all countries (except for the United States and 
Canada to a lesser extent) natural resources found in the bowels of the earth, are the property of the state.  
• Redistribution by big state. A small percentage of the population is occupied in extractive industries, but it 
is often the proceeds from the sale of minerals which make up the most share of gross national income. As a 
result, one of the very essential function of the rentier state becomes the redistribution in its many forms 
(transfers, subsidies for non-oil sector, large-scale public infrastructure projects, various privileges, etc.). One of 
the main ways of rent-seeking is the seizure of such transfers for private interests.  
• Elite isolation and security. For the above reasons, the rent from natural resources is easily appropriated 
and thus it is extremely capable to increase the wealth of ruling elite. Rents from natural resources can be used 
as a carrot through transfers to buy the population loyalty and as a stick, if dissatisfaction persists and grows into 
a political protest. Therefore, many commodity-exporting countries spend a large part of the budget for police, 
army and intelligence services.  
The quality of institutions determine whether the abundance of minerals is a bless or a curse.  
 
Main part: 
Within the framework of human capital not only the development of health, knowledge, human motivation, 
but also the development of institutions (economic freedom, property rights, stabilization funds, innovation, 
labor mobility) is performed as the form of human capital realization.  
Economic freedom is important because it represents one of the main prerequisites for the growth and 
development. The comparative analysis shows a strong positive correlation between economic growth and 
economic freedom in all studied countries (see Figure 1). Furthermore, it is a prerequisite for other parameters 
development. A higher level of economic freedom is positively correlated with such indicators as life 
expectancy, literacy, civil and political rights. At the same time it shows a negative correlation with poverty and 
corruption. Finally, economic freedom impacts not only the material well-being which is also important. 
Economic rights and, more specifically, property rights are an integral part of fundamental human rights. Thus, 
in the absence of economic freedom the system of civil and political rights can not be considered as complete 
one. 
The country exporting minerals is able to catch up in economic development if it will increase the level of 
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GDP per capita in the raw material economy in 2012 (in constant U.S. $ 2005)
World
 
Fig. 1: GDP per capita in raw material countries in 2012 (in constant USA dollars 
Data: World Bank 
 
A strong positive correlation between economic freedom in commodity economies with the level of real 
GDP per capita (BY purchasing power parity), as well as other economic and social indicators are demonstrated. 
The lower level of crime, corruption and illiteracy is observed where the degree of economic freedom is higher. 
The most important conclusion is based on the conducted studies, as well as on own researches. This conclusion 
states that the socio-economic performance of the countries with commodity-dependent economies depend 
primarily on the development of institutional system, which is the best indicator of economic freedom. 
It should be noted that although the practical experience clearly speaks in favor of private property in the 
area of natural resources extraction, this model is not a miracle cure. We already mentioned that institutions are 
a key element of effective economic model for the countries exporting natural resources. In the absence of 
strong and transparent institutions, private companies are quickly corrupted by rent-seeking as the 
"appropriation" is more profitable than productive entrepreneurial activity. The result is a structure that at first 
glance seems a privately owned but actually it acts as the system of government-linked group interests and 
clans. Moreover, in certain circumstances and under right policy certain state corporations achieve impressive 
results. Specific company establishment and especially the institutional environment in which it operates is 
important here. State-owned companies which establish a large-scale and long-term partnership with 
international corporations, as a rule, are much more successful than state-owned enterprises developing under 
autarky conditions. 
In recent decades, the idea of stabilization funds, undoubtedly gained its popularity, and some countries 
have successfully developed similar structures. The results of situation comparison in the states with and 
without such institutions favor stabilization funds to some extent. 
Stabilization funds with proper organization and management can perform the following tasks: 
• redeem the part of revenue inflows during the periods of high commodity prices and prohibit the national 
currency rate growth, which is one of "Dutch disease" main consequences;  
• restrain risks associated with price instability, and maintain the level of public costs during recessions;  
• contribute to fiscal discipline by limiting public costs.  
One of the most important external effects of shale boom is the undermining of common but preconceived 
opinion about the lack of innovation in extractive industries. Politicians who wish to be be considered as 
progressive, often repeated the idea that modernization and post-industrial era require restriction on mining. It is 
time to recognize this concept as an obsolete one. Shale revolution is essentially a technological breakthrough of 
the highest level. It is no coincidence that a breakthrough in the production of unconventional hydrocarbons 
occurred in the countries holding the highest places in the ranking of economic freedom - Canada, USA and 
Australia. Other favorable conditions, such as high gas prices in the 2000s also favored it. But an institutional 
component became the decisive factor. We are talking about the combination of secured property rights, a 
favorable tax regime, transparent and effective regulation and a minimum amount of bureaucratic red tape. It 
should also be noted that all three countries have numerous private companies in extractive sectors - from small 
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exploration companies to vertically integrated transnational corporations. Industrial extraction technologies for 
shale gas were developed by several companies: Chevron, Shell, Devon, Talisman Energy, Chesapeake and 
Range Resources. Institutional conditions which made the shale revolution possible, deserve careful study by 
the political elite of other countries, especially for the countries with commodity-dependent economies.  
In certain political framework and at appropriate institutional conditions the demand for labor in the 
countries with commodity-dependent economies can be partly met by immigrants. The reasonability for this 
decision in each country depends on several factors mostly of political and cultural than economic character. 
There are many examples of the country competently control concerning the influx of businesslike and creative 
people from abroad. By economic performance such countries exceed the countries, developing in autarky 
conditions. 
One of the most important phenomena in many commodity-dependent economies is rent-seeking. Of 
course, this phenomenon exists not only in countries rich in natural resources, but evidently it has the strongest 
impact leading to institution weakness. You can name a few reasons why countries with commodity-dependent 
economies are particularly vulnerable to rent-seeking. The actual control of the state (its level is much higher in 
extractive industries than in other sectors), raw nationalism, larger redistribution scale and elite security. In 
countries with commodity-dependent economies rent-seeking is one of the main obstacles to economic growth 
and social development. The regulation in some areas, such as security of property rights, an independent 
judiciary systems and law enforcement agencies are essential to the effective functioning of human capital. 
However, the more some regulation fields are removed from the state basic functions, the more likely its 
negative impact on economic growth. Regulation has the effect of both positive and negative action 
multiplication: effective regulation, strengthening the rule of law, could give a boost to economy, but even small 




The raw countries with a developed human capital, with more effective economic and political institutions 
are better able to manage income from its natural resources and to achieve better results in terms of economic 
growth and social development. Instead of fighting with different "curses" and "disease", states would be worth 
to look at themselves and analyze their own actions, as well as institutional conditions in the economies which 
they control. The quality of human capital determines whether the abundance of natural resources is a blessing 
or a curse.  
 
Summary: 
When struggling with the "dependence on raw materials" consequences  states often try to keep declining 
non-oil industrial sector through direct or indirect subsidies, such as by fuel price restrictions. Such industries 
dependent on subsidies become less effective so that they are able to involve the entire economy into recession. 
Thus the originally proposed as a cure, often becomes the stagnation source. "Commodity dependence" and the 
impact of price fluctuations in raw materials are primarily institutional rather than economic problems. They 
create difficulties in particular circumstances, usually associated with the absence of strong and transparent 
institutions. As for diversification, it makes sense when it leads to an overall increase in efficiency, which is 
hardly possible if the winners are assigned by state. The lack of diversification in economy is the result of lack 
of efficacy (and red tape), which does not allow companies to operate profitably in other sectors. When money 
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